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Abstract
Background: In order to comply with the provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in 1993 the
Canadian federal government introduced the Patented Medicine Notice of Compliance Linkage Regulations. These
regulations were meant to achieve a balance between the timely entry of generic medicines and the rights of
patent holders. The regulations tied the regulatory approval of generic medicines to the patent status of the
original brand-name product.
Discussion: Since their introduction the regulations have been a source of contention between the generic and
the brand-name industry. While the regulations have generated a considerable amount of work for the Federal
Court of Canada both sides dispute the interpretation of the “win rate” in the court cases. Similarly, there is no
agreement on whether multiple patents on single drugs represent a legitimate activity by the brand-name industry
or an “evergreening” tactic. The generic industry’s position is that the regulations are being abused leading to the
delay in the introduction of lower cost generic products by as much as 8 years. The brand-name companies
counter that the regulations are necessary because injunctions against the introduction of generic products are
frequently unavailable to them. The regulations were amended in 2006 and again in 2008 but both sides continue
to claim that the regulations favour the other party. The battle around the regulations also has an international
dimension with interventions by PhRMA, the trade association representing the United States based multinational
companies, arguing that the regulations are not stringent enough and that Canada needs to be placed on the U.S.
Priority Watch List of countries. Finally, there are multiple costs to Canadian society as a result of the NOC
regulations.
Summary: Despite the rhetoric there has been almost no empiric academic research done into the effect of the
regulations. In order to develop rational policy in this area a number of key research questions have been
formulated.
Background
Countries are increasingly reliant on generic medica-
tions to keep drug costs under control. In Canada
although more than 50% of all prescriptions are written
generically, they account for only 24% of total spending
[1]. The use of generics puts governments in a contra-
dictory role - on the one hand they need generics to
keep spending under control but on the other hand they
need to restrict the entry of generics to encourage
brand-name company investment. One key manifesta-
tion of this contradiction is in the Patented Medicine
Notice of Compliance (NOC) linkage regulations that
tie the regulatory approval of generic medications by
Health Canada to the patent status of the original
brand-name product.
This paper starts by reviewing the origins and opera-
tions of these linkage regulations. It then looks at two
contentious issues - the outcome of judicial hearings
and the consequences of multiple patents on individual
drugs. Linkage regulations are one of the battlegrounds
between the generic and brand-name arms of the indus-
try and the positions of the organizations representing
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regulations were amended and the next section looks at
the reasons why changes were made and their potential
impact. Linkage regulations are not just a domestic con-
cern, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA), the body representing brand-name
companies in the United States, has been an active par-
ticipant in the debate about them and the following sec-
tion addresses its arguments. The penultimate section
discusses how the linkage regulations are not just a mat-
ter of a dispute between brand and generic companies.
There are multiple costs to Canadian society as a result
of their existence. Finally, the paper concludes by posing
a series of questions that future research should
examine.
Origin of linkage regulations
In 1993, in order to comply with the requirements of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Canada abolished its system of using compulsory licen-
sing of pharmaceuticals as a cost control tool and estab-
lished a 20-year patent term for medications [2]. In
addition, the government introduced the NOC linkage
regulations, meaning that Health Canada, the national
drug regulatory agency, was prevented from issuing an
authorization for market entry for a generic until all of
the relevant patents on the brand-name product had
been proven to have expired.
The government’s explanation for the linkage regula-
tions were that they were part of its pharmaceutical
patent policy that sought “to balance effective patent
enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the
timely market entry of their lower priced generic com-
petitors.” [3] This explanation for the necessity to intro-
duce these regulations was echoed by the brand-name
industry [4]. One part of the balance was allowing gen-
eric companies to begin testing their products before
the patent had expired on the original product in order
for the generic product to be in a position to enter the
market as soon as possible after patent expiry. Having
removed a right available to all other patentees the link-
age regulations were introduced “...to ensure that this
new exception to patent infringement [was] not abused
by generic drug applicants seeking to sell their products
during the term of the competitor’s patent.” [3]
As a result, when the generic company submits its
application to get a product approved it also sends a
Notice of Allegation (NOA) to the patent holder claim-
ing that no patents are being infringed. The patent
holder then has 45 days in which to initiate an applica-
tion in the Federal Court of Canada seeking an order to
prohibit Health Canada from issuing a NOC to the gen-
eric manufacturer for a period of 24 (originally 30)
months. At that point, the matter may proceed to a
court hearing. The stay expires either at the end of the
24 months, when the patent expires or when the court
case is decided, whichever comes first [5].
Administration of linkage regulations
The NOC linkage regulations were formulated by Indus-
t r yC a n a d aa n da r ea d m i n i s t e r e db yt h eO f f i c eo f
Patented Medicines and Liaison (OPML), located in the
Therapeutic Products Directorate, Health Products and
Food Branch, Health Canada. They require the Minister
of Health to maintain a Patent Register (http://www.
patentregister.ca/). This consists of patent lists sub-
mitted in respect of eligible NOC-issued drugs, i.e.,
drugs that have been approved for marketing [5].
The Minister responsible for Health Canada may
refuse to add, or may delete, information from this
Patent Register. Each patent list is audited (for example
as to whether potential inclusions are mere “evergreen-
ing” attempts, i.e., attempts to unfairly extend patent life
in order to prevent generic competition) by the OPML.
Reports produced by that body provide statistics relating
to the maintenance of the Patent Register, including the
number of patents filed, the number of patents accepted
and rejected, and litigation resulting from the accep-
tance or rejection of patents for listing on the Patent
Register [6]. According to the 2008 report, from 1998 to
2008 there were an average of 54 NOAs received per
year and 41 court applications were commenced per
annum [6].
Discussion
Judicial hearings
The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association
(CGPA) claims that between 1998 and 2003, the generic
companies won 80% of the court cases [7]. Canada’s
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D) dis-
putes the ‘win rate’ for the generic companies in court
cases and presents its own figures showing that generic
and patentee ‘wins’ about balance each other out. How-
ever, Rx&D is interpreting the data in a potentially
biased manner. At the time when Rx&D presented its
statistics, there were 125 cases where there was no hear-
ing; the 20 cases where the NOA was withdrawn were
counted as a win for the patentee but the 100 cases
where the innovator either accepted the NOA or the
case was otherwise settled were not counted as wins for
the generic [8].
Overall between 1998 and 2008, the latest year for
which statistics are available, there have been 447 cases
where a court application was commenced. In 97 cases
the prohibition against issuing the generic company a
NOC was dismissed, prohibitions were granted 53 times
(in 5 cases there was a partial prohibition, i.e., more
than one patent was being disputed but the prohibition
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tions pending the resolution of the court case. (See
Table 1.) Out of 357 cases that have been closed, 13%
(46) have taken more than 24 months to resolve [6].
Although the federal government intended the NOC
proceedings to be summary in nature and therefore of
short duration, in practice this has not proved to be the
case [9]. The linkage regulations have also created a sig-
nificant backlog in the Canadian Federal Court system.
In 2008, there was a team of approximately 30 Federal
Court judges devoting some or all of their time to about
350 separate drug patent cases [10]. Furthermore, “The
Supreme Court of Canada has, on multiple occasions,
held that the automatic stay issued to patentees under
the NOC Regulations is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy, not
available to patentees in any industry outside of the
pharmaceutical industry.” [9]
Multiple patents on single drugs
A particularly contentious tactic is the use of multiple
patents by brand-name companies to delay the appear-
ance of a generic product. The CGPA’sc o n t e n t i o ni s
that the brand-name companies continually listed new
patents on a product, each of which can trigger a new
NOA and an additional stay on the appearance of a gen-
eric. In this way, competition is delayed [7]. The use of
multiple patents involves about half the products with
registered patents. As of the end of December 2008
there were 494 medicines listed on the Patent Register.
Of these 248 had one patented registered, 120 had two
and out of the remaining 126, 40 had more than 5
patents (one of these had 22 patents) [6]. In the past,
these multiple patents, filed over a period of time, had
the effect of delaying a final decision about marketing a
generic product for 8 years [11].
The brand-name companies maintain that multiple
patents are not an issue. Their position is that there is
always ongoing research into drugs and that it is natural
that new patents will be filed, reflecting improvements
such as moving from a three pill a day regimen to once a
day dosing. The multinationals also say that in 95% of
cases all subsequent patents will be issued within 10 years
of the initial patent and therefore all of the patents may be
addressed in the same linkage proceeding. But if the effec-
tive patent life is only 10 years, as Rx&D claims it is, then
new patents are being filed as old ones expire. Even if
patent life is a couple of years beyond 10 years there can
still be overlapping 24-month stays depending on when
the generic company files for a NOC. According to Rx&D
in that situation, and in the situation where court cases
take more than 24 months to resolve, all the generic com-
panies have to do is market the older version of the pro-
duct on expiry of the original patent [8]. However, this
argument ignores the fact that the main reason for launch-
ing a new formulation of a drug is to switch doctors to
that version before a generic is available in order to under-
cut the market for the generic. The marketing of new for-
mulations is something that brand-name companies spend
millions of advertising dollars doing.
Finally, the acknowledgement that there are multiple
patents on single products, even though there is dis-
agreement regarding their effects, is ironic. During the
debate leading up to the 1993 legislation establishing
the linkage regulations the Minister of Industry, Mining
and Technology and the Director General of the Chemi-
cal and Bio-Industries Branch in the Department of
Industry, Science and Technology both strenuously
maintained that each drug had a single main patent and
once that patent expired anyone could copy the drug
and bring it to market [12].
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association
The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association
(CGPA) claims that “not only is this abuse [i.e., the link-
age regulations] of Canada’sp a t e n tr e g i m ee x t r e m e l y
harmful to Canada’s generic pharmaceutical industry,
the Canadian public loses out on millions of dollars in
savings by having to pay for the higher-priced brand-
name version for an extended period of time. The delays
caused by these needless court battles have cost Cana-
dians, their governments and private insurers hundreds
of millions of dollars.” [7]
The CGPA also contends that the regulations place
generic companies in the position of facing “double jeo-
pardy”. Even if a generic company is successful in litiga-
tion under the linkage regulations and gets its product
on the market, it can still be sued again on the same
patents it has just litigated. This situation exists because
litigation under the regulations does not result in a final
determination by the court regarding whether the patent
in question is valid or infringed [11]. Since the NOC
system is not designed to provide for a full exploration
of the validity of a patent, for some products there are
multiple court proceedings. According to a recent report
commissioned by the CPGA the possibility that the
patentee may subsequently sue for infringement is a
barrier to the entry of generic drugs [9].
Table 1 Outcome of court cases, 1998 - 2008
Category Number
Court applications commenced 447
Partial prohibitions granted 5
Prohibitions pending resolution 78
Prohibitions discontinued 219
Prohibitions granted 48
Prohibitions dismissed 97
Source: Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison [6].
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Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies
(Rx&D) counters that these regulations are necessary
because “generics do not have to concern themselves
with a possible interlocutory injunction [a temporary
injunction that lasts only until the end of the trial dur-
ing which the injunction was sought] to prevent infring-
ing sales once an infringing generic product is on the
m a r k e t .S t a t i s t i c ss h o wt h a tt h i sr e m e d yi sa v a i l a b l ei n
pharmaceutical cases approximately half as often as in
other industry patent cases. Indeed, as a result of the
inability of pharmaceutical patentees to obtain interlocu-
tory injunctions to prevent the complete destruction of
their intellectual property rights and market share, the
l i n k a g er e g u l a t i o n sa r et h eo n l ym e a n sf o rC a n a d at o
meet its international obligations to provide an effective
enforcement mechanism for patents.” [8] In-other-
words, Rx&D’s claim is that the availability of injunc-
tions against the marketing of a generic product, the
remedy that would be available in the absence of the
linkage regulations, is insufficient protection because
these injunctions are frequently unavailable to the
brand-name companies.
2006 and 2008 NOC amendments to the regulations
Generic companies had long been complaining that
brand-name companies were abusing the linkage regula-
tions by adding on irrelevant new patents, [11] but criti-
cisms about the regulations were also coming from
other sources. The Competition Bureau rejected a com-
plaint from the National Union of Public and General
Employees that brand-name companies were using the
claim of patent infringement as a way to delay the entry
of generic drugs. However, at the same time the Bureau
noted that “A number of court decisions over the last
several years regarding what constitutes a relevant
patent and the time period during which such a patent
can be added have somewhat altered the balance con-
tained in the NOC Regulations between the competing
interests of the brand name pharmaceutical patent
holders and generic drug companies. There is also no
ready mechanism in the NOC Regulations for compen-
sating consumers affected by delays in the introduction
of generic drugs, thereby creating a possible incentive
for brand name pharmaceutical companies to strategi-
cally use the NOC Regulations to improperly delay gen-
eric drug entry.” [13]
In October 2006, the Canadian federal government
seemingly recognized the validity of these criticisms and
limited brand-name companies use of follow-on patents
by amending the regulations. These amendments pre-
vented any new patents that the brand-name companies
filed after a generic company had submitted an applica-
tion for approval of its product from being considered
in the linkage regulations process. Moreover the new
regulations made it clear that patents covering areas
without direct therapeutic application, such as processes
or metabolic intermediates, could not be used to delay
generic approval [3]. Less than two months later the
Supreme Court of Canada also recognized that the
brand-name companies had been abusing the linkage
regulations by adding irrelevant patents [14].
Although the change described above was favourable
to the interests of the generic companies, there were
also changes that they viewed less favourably. To dis-
courage abuse of the linkage regulations by the brand-
name companies, section 8 of the regulations had pre-
viously allowed generic companies to collect “damages
or profits” f r o mt h eb r a n d - n a m ec o m p a n yw h e nt h e
generic drug was wrongfully kept off the market by the
automatic 24 month stay. One of the 2006 amendments
removed the words “or profits” from section 8 meaning
that brand-name companies could no longer be pena-
lized with the loss of their profits acquired during the
period in which a court found that the brand has abused
the automatic stay provision. The position of the CGPA
was that “The Government of Canada has essentially
made it less economic for anyone to make the invest-
ment necessary to challenge the brand-name company’s
monopoly, and introduce a low-cost generic product to
market.” [15]
Regulations were further amended in 2008. The gov-
ernment argued that these new amendments were
necessary because of a Federal Court of Canada ruling
that changed the intent of the 2006 amendments. The
intent of the these amendments was to exempt ("grand-
father”)p a t e n t ss u b m i t t e df o rl i s t i n gt h a tw e r ei nc o n -
formity with the pre-2006 rules from coming under the
2006 changes. The Federal Court ruling was seen as
undermining that protection and as a consequence there
was a concern that many patents submitted in full com-
pliance with the listing requirements, as they were inter-
preted and applied prior to June 17, 2006, could be
deleted from, or not added to, the Patent Register. This
could result in earlier than anticipated loss of market
exclusivity for a number of brand-name drugs. The new
regulations prohibited the deletion of grandfathered
patents from the Patent Register and prohibited the gov-
ernment from refusing to add any patent solely on the
basis of the Federal Court ruling [16].
When it introduced the 2008 amendments, the federal
government acknowledged that they “’could result in
delayed savings to consumers and provincial drug plans.’
But those concerns were counterbalanced, it said, by the
pharmaceutical industry’sn e e dt oh a v ec o n f i d e n c ei n
Canada as a place to invest in research and develop-
ment.” Whether or not companies continued to view
Canada as a good place to invest despite the amendments
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decision to close its Montreal research facility and lay off
most of the 200 employees [17].
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA)
PhRMA regards the 2008 regulation changes as a posi-
tive step but at the same time maintains that “serious
and systematic deficiencies remain with the PM
[Patented Medicines] NOC Regulations.” [18] PhRMA
bases its position on three points: brand-name compa-
nies have no effective right of appeal; there are limita-
tions on the listing of valid patents; patent infringement
proceedings need strengthening.
On the first point, PhRMA argues that if the generic
company wins the court case under the summary pro-
ceeding, aimed only at determining if the allegation is
justified, and is allowed to market its product, then once
a NOC has been issued any appeal filed by the patentee
becomes moot. As a result of the summary nature of
the proceeding, there is no discovery and there may be
constraints on obtaining and introducing evidence and
cross-examination. “The patentee is then left with no
alternative but to start another proceeding (an action
for patent infringement) once the generic enters the
market.” In contrast, according to PhRMA, the right of
appeal is still available to a generic producer if it loses
its initial court case under the summary proceeding [18].
On the second point, PhRMA claims “Patent owners
are prevented from listing their patents in the Patent
Register established under the PM (NOC) Regulations if
the patents do not meet certain arbitrary timing require-
ments or are of a type not eligible for listing.” Finally,
PhRMA says that while brand-name companies may
choose to try and protect their patent rights through an
interlocutory injunction “to prevent the market entry of
the generic product or to seek its withdrawal from the
market, these motions rarely succeed in Canada even if
there is compelling evidence of infringement. Addition-
ally, it takes years before an action for patent infringe-
ment is tried. By then the innovative company’sm a r k e t
share can be severely eroded by the marketing of the
generic product.” [18]
In light of these (and other) problems with respect to
the way that Canada deals with prescription medicines
PhRMA “requested that Canada remain on the Priority
Watch List for the 2010 Special 301 Report and that
the U.S. Government continue to seek assurances that
the problems described herein are quickly and effectively
resolved (Emphasis in original).” The Special 301 Report
is an annual publication issued by the United States
Trade Representative which examines in detail the ade-
quacy and effectiveness of intellectual property rights in
countries around the world. Based on this report
countries may be designated in the categories of Priority
Watch List, Watch List, and/or Section 306 Monitoring
status. Although Canada was put on the Priority Watch
List in 2009 and remained on it in 2010 the main reason
was its lack of action on the question of copyright
reform. Patent protection for pharmaceuticals was not
mentioned in the report [19].
Cost to Canadian society
The linkage regulations are not just a matter of a dispute
between brand-name and generic companies. There are
multiple costs to Canadian society associated with their
existence starting with the administrative costs of main-
taining the Patent Register to the costs to the judicial sys-
tem from the multiple patent litigation cases. In addition,
there are costs to the provincial drug plans. The increase
in drug spending attendant on the delay in the appear-
ance of generic equivalents may partly explain why pro-
vincial governments have increased co-payments and
deductibles for recipients of publicly funded drug plans.
The CGPA claims that the 2008 amendments will cost
consumers and taxpayers tens of millions of dollars
annually [20]. The projected increase in costs from these
amendments prompted the governments in British
Columbia and New Brunswick to oppose them [21]. New
Brunswick estimated that it would add $4 million to its
annual drug bill of $162 million [22]. Finally, the NOC
regulations allow generic companies to seek lost profits if
they are successful in NOC proceedings. However, there
is no compensation to payers (public, private or those
who paid out of pocket) who paid brand prices instead of
generic ones [9].
Summary
T h ep u t a t i v er e a s o nf o rt h eN O Cl i n k a g er e g u l a t i o n s
was to provide a balance between the economic interests
of the brand-name and generic pharmaceutical compa-
nies. While these regulations have certainly provided
work for the court system, despite having been on the
books for over 17 years there has been almost no
empiric research undertaken into their effects. At pre-
sent, most of the discussion about the regulations con-
sists of claims and counterclaims from supporters of
one side of the debate or the other. Among the unan-
swered questions are the following:
1. How might the position of PhRMA regarding the
Canadian regulations affect overall trade relations
between Canada and the United States?
2. Do the regulations affect investment decisions by
either generic or brand-name companies?
3. Do the regulations discourage generic companies
from introducing some drugs?
4. Do the regulations affect the value of drugs
exported from or imported into Canada?
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provinces as a result of the regulations because of the
delay in the introduction of generics and because during
that delay brand-name companies have convinced doc-
tors to switch to a patent protected version of the pro-
duct or a new product?
6. Do the regulations lead to R&D investment into
ways of modifying products with a view to “evergreen-
ing” as opposed to investment in innovative products?
7. What are the legal costs associated with the regula-
tions from the point of view of all parties - federal and
provincial governments and the generic and brand-name
companies?
Answers to questions such as these will help guide the
government in future policy decisions about the regula-
tions and allow a determination of whether or not the
regulations are actually balancing the scales or tipping
them in favour of one side.
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